We study the standard voting model with randomization. A Random Social Choice Function (or RSCF) satisfies the tops-only property if the social lottery under each preference profile depends only on voters' peaks of preferences. We identify a general condition on domains of preferences (the Interior Property and the Exterior Property) which ensures that every strategy-proof RSCF satisfying unanimity has the tops-only property. We provide applications of this sufficient condition and use it to derive new results.
Random Social Choice Functions, Unanimity, Strategy-proofness, Tops-only Property, Interior Property, Exterior Property
CHATTERJI, Shurojit and ZENG, Huaxia.
On Random Social Choice Functions with the Tops-only Property. (2015). 1-59. Research Collection School Of Economics.
Available at: http://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1777
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