Publication Type

Working Paper

Publication Date

9-2015

Abstract

We study the standard voting model with randomization. A Random Social Choice Function (or RSCF) satisfies the tops-only property if the social lottery under each preference profile depends only on voters' peaks of preferences. We identify a general condition on domains of preferences (the Interior Property and the Exterior Property) which ensures that every strategy-proof RSCF satisfying unanimity has the tops-only property. We provide applications of this sufficient condition and use it to derive new results.

Keywords

Random Social Choice Functions, Unanimity, Strategy-proofness, Tops-only Property, Interior Property, Exterior Property

Discipline

Economic Theory

Research Areas

Economic Theory

First Page

1

Last Page

59

Embargo Period

11-30-2015

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.

Share

COinS