Title

First-Mover Advantage and Organizational Structure

Publication Type

Journal Article

Publication Date

1993

Abstract

This paper looks at first-mover advantage and its effects on organizational structure and size. The framework is the project-selection model and the key assumption is that managers are fallible so that decision-making is imperfect. The analysis suggests that when there is a first-mover advantage, decentralized and smaller organizations, such as the polyarchy and the committee, are preferable since they are speedier in making decisions despite the reduced accuracy in selecting projects.

Discipline

Economics

Research Areas

Applied Microeconomics

Publication

Economics Letters

Volume

43

Issue

1

First Page

47

Last Page

52

ISSN

0165-1765

Identifier

10.1016/0165-1765(93)90133-w

Publisher

Elsevier

Additional URL

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(93)90133-w

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