Egalitarian Division under Leontief Preferences
We consider the problem of fairly dividing l divisible goods among n agents with the generalized Leontief preferences. We propose and characterize the class of generalized egalitarian rules which satisfy efficiency, group strategy-proofness, anonymity, resource monotonicity, population monotonicity, envy-freeness and consistency. On the Leontief domain, our rules generalize the egalitarian-equivalent rules with reference bundles. We also extend our rules to agent-specific and endowment-specific egalitarian rules. The former is a larger class of rules satisfying all the previous properties except anonymity and envy-freeness. The latter is a class of efficient, group strategy-proof, anonymous and individually rational rules when the resources are assumed to be privately owned.
Fair division, Egalitarian rules, Group strategy-proofness, Generalized Leontief preferences, Social choice, Exchange economies
LI, Jin and XUE, Jingyi.
Egalitarian Division under Leontief Preferences. (2013). Economic Theory. 54, (3), 597-622. Research Collection School Of Economics.
Available at: http://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1622