The paper proves the following result: every path-connected domain of preferences that admits a strategy-proof, unanimous, tops-only random social choice function satisfying a compromise property, is single-peaked. Conversely, every single-peaked domain admits a random social choice function satisfying these properties. Single-peakedness is defined with respect to arbitrary trees. We also show that a maximal domain that admits a strategy-proof, unanimous, tops-only random social choice function satisfying a stronger version of the compromise property, is single-peaked on a line. A converse to this result also holds. The paper provides justification of the salience of single-peaked preferences and evidence in favour of the Gul conjecture (Barbera (2010)).
Random Social Choice Functions, Strategy-proofness, Compromise, Singlepeaked Preferences
Economics | Economic Theory
Singapore Management University Economics and Statistics Working Paper Series, Paper No. 13-2014
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CHATTERJI, Shurojit; SEN, Arunava; and ZENG, Huaxia.
A Characterization of Single-Peaked Preferences via Random Social Choice Functions. (2014). 1-20. Research Collection School Of Economics.
Available at: http://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1597
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