Publication Type

Working Paper

Publication Date

12-2014

Abstract

We construct a sequential investment model to investigate individual firms’ strategic choices of organizational forms when outsourcing their intermediate products. Our results indicate that as a result of the encouragement effect of sequential complementary investments, sequential investment alleviates the underinvestment caused by the hold-up problem. Thereafter, we analyze the impact of sequential investment on the choice of ownership structure. We show that contrary to the result of the standard property rights theory, strictly complementary assets could be owned separately.

Keywords

Sequential Investment, Hold-up, Underinvestment, Optimal Ownership Structure

Discipline

Finance

Research Areas

Applied Microeconomics

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.

Comments

(under review Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics)

Included in

Finance Commons

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