Publication Type

Working Paper

Publication Date

12-2014

Abstract

We investigate hold-up with simultaneous and sequential investment. We show that if the encouragement effect of sequential complementary investments dominates the delay effect, sequential investment alleviates the underinvestment caused by the hold-up problem. Further, if it is allowed to choose when to invest, strategic delay occurs when the encouragement effect of sequential complementary investments dominates the delay effect.

Keywords

Sequential Investment, Hold-up, Underinvestment, Strategic Delay

Discipline

Finance

Research Areas

Applied Microeconomics

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.

Comments

under review B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics

Included in

Finance Commons

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