The Persistence of Goodness
Experimental evidence and economic examples like Basu's (1984) taxi-driver problem illustrate that many people are honest (or good) even when beyond the reach of the law, and without repeated interactions or reputation effects. We provide game-theoretic underpinnings of the level of goodness in a population. For appropriate parameter ranges, a certain level of good behaviour will emerge as an evolutionarily stable equilibrium: virtue will not be driven out of the population, even in a Darwinian world of the survival of the fittest. The long-run equilibrium proportion of good behaviour is independent of the level of intrinsic goodness.
Behavioral Economics | Economics
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics
GUHA, Ashok S. and GUHA, Brishti.
The Persistence of Goodness. (2012). Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics. 168, (3), 432-443. Research Collection School Of Economics.
Available at: http://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1426