Title

The Persistence of Goodness

Publication Type

Journal Article

Publication Date

9-2012

Abstract

Experimental evidence and economic examples like Basu's (1984) taxi-driver problem illustrate that many people are honest (or good) even when beyond the reach of the law, and without repeated interactions or reputation effects. We provide game-theoretic underpinnings of the level of goodness in a population. For appropriate parameter ranges, a certain level of good behaviour will emerge as an evolutionarily stable equilibrium: virtue will not be driven out of the population, even in a Darwinian world of the survival of the fittest. The long-run equilibrium proportion of good behaviour is independent of the level of intrinsic goodness.

Discipline

Behavioral Economics | Economics

Research Areas

Applied Microeconomics

Publication

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics

Volume

168

Issue

3

First Page

432

Last Page

443

ISSN

0932-4569

Identifier

10.1628/093245612802920971

Additional URL

http://doi.org/10.1628/093245612802920971