We consider a collective model of a household in which each member has a utility function satisfying the weak separability condition. We show that the separability at the individual level carries over to the household level and that the allocation of private goods in any Pareto-efficient allocation can be supported as a Pareto-efficient allocation of private sub-problem. We also provide the necessary and sufficient condition for the Pareto weight for the private sub-problem to move in the same direction as the household Pareto weight.
Collective model, intra-household resource allocation, bargaining, sparability
Singapore Management University School of Economics and Social Sciences
City or Country
FUJII, Tomoki and ISHIKAWA, Ryuichiro.
A note on separability and intra-household resource allocation in a collective household model. (2012). 06-2012, 1-7. Research Collection School Of Economics.
Available at: http://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1380
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.