Publication Type

Working Paper

Publication Date

3-2012

Abstract

We consider a collective model of a household in which each member has a utility function satisfying the weak separability condition. We show that the separability at the individual level carries over to the household level and that the allocation of private goods in any Pareto-efficient allocation can be supported as a Pareto-efficient allocation of private sub-problem. We also provide the necessary and sufficient condition for the Pareto weight for the private sub-problem to move in the same direction as the household Pareto weight.

Keywords

Collective model, intra-household resource allocation, bargaining, sparability

Discipline

Behavioral Economics

Research Areas

Applied Microeconomics

Volume

06-2012

First Page

1

Last Page

7

Publisher

Singapore Management University School of Economics and Social Sciences

City or Country

Singapore

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.

Comments

Published in Review of Economics of the Household doi:10.1007/s11150-012-9155-8

Share

COinS