Pirates and Fishermen: Is Less Patrolling Always Bad?
Motivated by the Somali fishermen–pirates, I explore the time allocation decision of potential pirates between piracy and an alternative non-violent occupation, fishing, when the returns of both piracy and fishing are sensitive to patrolling intensity. For a range of parameters, the static model yields multiple equilibria, an “efficient” one with no patrolling and low piracy, a less efficient equilibrium with intermediate levels of both piracy and patrolling and a highly inefficient high-patrolling high-piracy equilibrium. Analyzing the dynamic analogue, I obtain the surprising result that sufficiently low patrolling can be a good strategy.
Pirates, Fishermen, Patrolling, Multiple equilibria, Policy responses
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Pirates and Fishermen: Is Less Patrolling Always Bad?. (2012). Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 81, (1), 29-38. Research Collection School Of Economics.
Available at: http://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1346