Title

Pirates and Fishermen: Is Less Patrolling Always Bad?

Publication Type

Journal Article

Publication Date

1-2012

Abstract

Motivated by the Somali fishermen–pirates, I explore the time allocation decision of potential pirates between piracy and an alternative non-violent occupation, fishing, when the returns of both piracy and fishing are sensitive to patrolling intensity. For a range of parameters, the static model yields multiple equilibria, an “efficient” one with no patrolling and low piracy, a less efficient equilibrium with intermediate levels of both piracy and patrolling and a highly inefficient high-patrolling high-piracy equilibrium. Analyzing the dynamic analogue, I obtain the surprising result that sufficiently low patrolling can be a good strategy.

Keywords

Pirates, Fishermen, Patrolling, Multiple equilibria, Policy responses

Discipline

Behavioral Economics

Research Areas

Applied Microeconomics

Publication

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volume

81

Issue

1

First Page

29

Last Page

38

ISSN

0167-2681

Identifier

10.1016/j.jebo.2011.09.012

Publisher

Elsevier

Additional URL

http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2011.09.012