Publication Type

Journal Article

Publication Date

5-2011

Abstract

Even where all agents are risk-neutral, merchants can insure themselves against piracy. Such self-insurance is surprisingly invulnerable to moral hazard. Further, there exist a patrolling intensity and/or penalties for captured pirates which, along with mercantile self-insurance, could eliminate piracy.

Keywords

Piracy, Violent crime, Economies of scale, Penalties, Moral hazard, Selfinsurance

Discipline

Behavioral Economics

Research Areas

Applied Microeconomics

Publication

Economics Letters

Volume

111

Issue

2

First Page

147

Last Page

150

ISSN

0165-1765

Identifier

10.1016/j.econlet.2011.01.030

Publisher

Elsevier

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.

Additional URL

http://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.01.030

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