Publication Type

Journal Article

Publication Date

11-2010

Abstract

We propose an evolutionary analysis of a voting game where citizens have a preference for conformism that adds to the instrumental preference for the electoral outcome. Multiple equilibria arise, and some generate high turnout. Simulations of best response dynamics show that high turnout is asymptotically stable if conformism matters but its likelihood depends on the reference group for conformism: high turnout is more likely when voters care about their own group's choice, as this better overrides the free rider problem of voting games. Comparative statics on the voting cost distribution, the population's size or the groups' composition are also done.

Keywords

Turnout, coordination games, Poisson games, conformism, selection dynamics.

Discipline

Behavioral Economics | Political Science

Research Areas

Applied Microeconomics

Publication

Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control

Volume

36

Issue

10

First Page

1431

Last Page

1447

ISSN

0165-1889

Publisher

Elsevier

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.

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