We show how an interaction between the skewness of the sex ratio and the jump in divorce rates after a liberalization in divorce laws can obtain in a model of marriage market matching with non-transferable utility. This model is partly motivated by a significant cross-country correlation between these two variables. We also find that men’s hopes or fears about women’s marriage market odds are self-confirming under mutual consent, resulting in multiple equilibria. The multiplicity vanishes with a more skewed sex ratio or a liberalization of divorce laws. Our work sheds some light on the possible implications of divorce liberalization and pro-marriage policies.
Divorce, sex ratios, marriage, skewness, matching, non-transferable utility
Family, Life Course, and Society | Statistics and Probability
Sex Ratios, Divorce Laws and the Marriage Market. (2010). Research Collection School Of Economics.
Available at: http://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1243
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