Publication Type

Working Paper

Publication Date

5-2010

Abstract

In this paper, we investigate domains that admit “well-behaved” strategy-proof social choice functions. We show that if the number of voters is even, then every domain that satisfies a richness condition and admits an anonymous, tops-only, unanimous and strategy-proof social choice function, must be semi-single-peaked. Conversely every semi-single-peaked domain admits an anonymous, tops-only, unanimous and strategy-proof social choice function. Semi-single-peaked domains are generalizations of single-peaked domains on a tree introduced by Demange (1982

Keywords

Strategy-proofness; Restricted domains; Semi-single-peaked domains

Discipline

Economic Theory

Research Areas

Economic Theory

First Page

1

Last Page

28

Publisher

Singapore Management University, School of Economics. Working Paper Series, Paper No. 07-2010

City or Country

Singapore

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.

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