In this paper, we investigate domains that admit “well-behaved” strategy-proof social choice functions. We show that if the number of voters is even, then every domain that satisfies a richness condition and admits an anonymous, tops-only, unanimous and strategy-proof social choice function, must be semi-single-peaked. Conversely every semi-single-peaked domain admits an anonymous, tops-only, unanimous and strategy-proof social choice function. Semi-single-peaked domains are generalizations of single-peaked domains on a tree introduced by Demange (1982
Strategy-proofness; Restricted domains; Semi-single-peaked domains
Singapore Management University, School of Economics. Working Paper Series, Paper No. 07-2010
City or Country
CHATTERJI, Shurojit; Sanver, Remzi; and Sen, Arunava.
On Domains that Admit Well-Behaved Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions. (2010). 1-28. Research Collection School Of Economics.
Available at: http://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1229
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.