Title

Directed Altruism and Enforced Reciprocity in Social Networks: How Much Is a Friend Worth?

Publication Type

Journal Article

Publication Date

11-2009

Abstract

We conducted online field experiments in large real-world social networks in order to decompose prosocial giving into three components: (1) baseline altruism toward randomly selected strangers, (2) directed altruism that favors friends over random strangers, and (3) giving motivated by the prospect of future interaction. Directed altruism increases giving to friends by 52% relative to random strangers, whereas future interaction effects increase giving by an additional 24% when giving is socially efficient. This finding suggests that future interaction affects giving through a repeated game mechanism where agents can be rewarded for granting efficiency-enhancing favors. We also find that subjects with higher baseline altruism have friends with higher baseline altruism.

Keywords

modified dictator games, directed altruism, enforced reciprocity, social networks

Discipline

Behavioral Economics

Research Areas

Econometrics

Publication

Quarterly Journal of Economics

Volume

124

Issue

4

First Page

1815

Last Page

1851

ISSN

0033-5533

Identifier

10.1162/qjec.2009.124.4.1815

Additional URL

http://dx.doi.org//10.1162/qjec.2009.124.4.1815

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