Publication Type

Journal Article

Publication Date

12-2007

Abstract

We consider a deterministic evolutionary model where players form expectations about future play. Players are not fully rational and have expectations that change over time in response to current payoffs and feedback from the past. We provide a complete characterization of the qualitative dynamics so induced for a two strategies population game, and relate our findings to standard evolutionary dynamics and equilibrium selection when agents have rational forward looking expectations.

Keywords

evolutionary games, dynamic systems, bounded rationality.

Discipline

Econometrics

Research Areas

Econometrics

Publication

Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control

Volume

32

Issue

12

First Page

3877

Last Page

3894

ISSN

0165-1889

Publisher

Elsevier

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.

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Econometrics Commons

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