Publication Type

Journal Article

Publication Date

2-2008

Abstract

In this paper, we develop a model of collusion in which two firms play an infinitelyrepeated Bertrand game when each firm has a privately-informed agent. The colluding firms, fixing prices, allocate market shares based on the agent’s information as to cost types. We emphasize that the presence of privately-informed agents may provide firms with a strategic opportunity to exploit an interaction between internal contracting and market-sharing arrangement: the contracts with agents may be used to induce firms’ truthful communication in their collusion, and collusive market-share allocation may act to reduce the agents’ information rents.

Keywords

Price-fixing collusion; Private information; Internal contract; Information distortion

Discipline

Econometrics

Research Areas

Applied Microeconomics

Publication

Games and Economic Behavior

Volume

68

Issue

2

First Page

646

Last Page

669

ISSN

0899-8256

Publisher

Elsevier

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.

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Econometrics Commons

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