Executive equity compensation and earnings management: A quantile regression approach
Prior research has investigated the association between chief executive officer (CEO) equity compensation and earnings management but the evidence is not conclusive. Our empirical results show that CEO equity compensation is positively associated with discretionary accruals at the high quantiles of discretionary accruals, but the coefficient on equity compensation decreases monotonically as the quantile lowers, and is significantly negative at the low quantiles of discretionary accruals. The results are robust to alternative measures of CEO equity incentives and earnings management and alternative model specifications. Overall, the quantile regression results suggest that equity compensation motivates income-increasing earnings management when discretionary accruals are at the high tail of the distribution. Conversely, equity compensation mitigates income-increasing earnings management at the low tail of the distribution of discretionary accruals.
Accounting | Corporate Finance | Human Resources Management
Corporate Governance, Auditing and Risk Management
American Accounting Association Annual Meeting
City or Country
Washington DC, USA
CHEN, Chih-Ying and LI, Ming Yuan.
Executive equity compensation and earnings management: A quantile regression approach. (2012). American Accounting Association Annual Meeting. Research Collection School Of Accountancy.
Available at: http://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research/989