This paper investigates the role of management earnings forecasts in mitigating information asymmetry between investors andmanagers relating to moral hazard, and explains how earnings guidance facilitates monitoring. I demonstrate that firms that are more susceptible to moral hazard problems and more difficult to monitor are also more likely to issue annual earningsforecasts and they do so more frequently. In addition, I examine how firm internal governance drives forecasting decisions andshow that stronger board governance and managerial equity incentives are associated with higher likelihood and frequency of forecast issuance. Finally, I provide robust evidence that managerial equity incentives are associated with more informative andhigher quality guidance. In particular, I find that these forecasts are more accurate, unbiased, more specific and timely, consistent with equity incentives aligning shareholders’ and managers’ interests regarding disclosure decisions. However, I find mixed evidence on the association between board governance and forecast quality.
Earnings guidance, corporate governance, executive compensation
Corporate Governance, Auditing and Risk Management
LEE, Jimmy Kiat Bee.
Moral hazard, firms’ internal governance and management earnings forecasts. (2012). Research Collection School Of Accountancy.
Available at: http://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research/796