Publication Type
Journal Article
Publication Date
3-2010
Abstract
In this study, we examine the effect of firm-level governance on the firm's choice of an external auditor. Further, we test how the relation between corporate governance and auditor choice may be affected by the strength of legal environment. The results show that firm-level governance scores are positively related to the firm's auditor choice. This association is strengthened by country-level legal protection. Specifically, the positive association between auditor choice and the firm-level governance scores is weaker (stronger) in a low (high) legal environment. These findings are robust after controlling for determinants that were found to be significant in earlier research. Overall, our results suggest that the benefits arising from the employment of high-quality auditors are likely to be greater when legal environment is stronger because both auditors and firms are subject to more severe legal punishments for opportunistic behavior.
Keywords
Auditor choice, corporate governance, emerging markets, legal environment, investor protection
Discipline
Accounting | Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics | Corporate Finance
Research Areas
Corporate Governance, Auditing and Risk Management
Publication
Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies
Volume
13
Issue
1
First Page
91
Last Page
126
ISSN
0219-0915
Identifier
10.1142/S0219091510001883
Publisher
World Scientific
Citation
Hossain, Mahmud; LIM, Chee Yeow; and TAN, Patricia Mui Siang.
Corporate Governance, Investor Protection, and Auditor Choice in Emerging Markets. (2010). Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies. 13, (1), 91-126.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research/643
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Additional URL
https://doi.org/10.1142/S0219091510001883
Included in
Accounting Commons, Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics Commons, Corporate Finance Commons