Publication Type

Journal Article

Publication Date

1-2017

Abstract

In this note, we examine the effect of CEO marital status on the riskiness of financial reporting. Using multiple proxies, we find that firms headed by a single CEO display a higher degree of earnings management than those headed by a married CEO. The effect is economically significant. Our results persist in an instrumental variable regression, suggesting that our results are not driven by innate heterogeneity in preferences.

Keywords

marital status, earnings management, risk-taking

Discipline

Finance and Financial Management | Labor Relations

Research Areas

Financial Intermediation and Information

Publication

European Accounting Review

Volume

26

Issue

1

First Page

153

Last Page

158

ISSN

0963-8180

Identifier

10.1080/09638180.2016.1266958

Publisher

Taylor & Francis (Routledge): SSH Titles

Copyright Owner and License

Authors

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.

Additional URL

http://doi.org/10.1080/09638180.2016.1266958

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