In this note, we examine the effect of CEO marital status on the riskiness of financial reporting. Using multiple proxies, we find that firms headed by a single CEO display a higher degree of earnings management than those headed by a married CEO. The effect is economically significant. Our results persist in an instrumental variable regression, suggesting that our results are not driven by innate heterogeneity in preferences.
marital status, earnings management, risk-taking
Finance and Financial Management | Labor Relations
Financial Intermediation and Information
European Accounting Review
Taylor & Francis (Routledge): SSH Titles
HILLARY, Gilles; Sterling HUANG; and XU, Yanping.
Marital status and earnings management. (2017). European Accounting Review. 26, (1), 153-158. Research Collection School Of Accountancy.
Available at: http://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research/1544
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