Publication Type

Working Paper

Publication Date

9-2017

Abstract

We examine how board co-option, defined as the fraction of the board comprising directors appointed after the CEO assumed office, is related to clawback adoption. We find that co-opted boards have a lower probability of adopting clawback provisions. Further, the negative association between board co-option and clawback adoption is more pronounced when at least one co-opted member is on the compensation committee and when there is a higher likelihood that a clawback provision will be triggered. Finally, we find that board co-option is an important mechanism through which longer-tenured CEOs reduce the likelihood of clawback adoption.

Keywords

Clawbacks, Co-opted boards, Corporate governance

Discipline

Accounting | Corporate Finance

Research Areas

Corporate Reporting and Disclosure

First Page

1

Last Page

44

Copyright Owner and License

Authors

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.

Additional URL

https://ssrn.com/abstract=2538916

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