Publication Type

Conference Paper

Version

Preprint

Publication Date

8-2014

Abstract

This study examines the informativeness and credibility of the reasons cited by independent directors for resignation. Given that directors are privy to private information about the firm, they may resign in anticipation of future underperformance in order to limit potential damage to their reputation. We posit that directors have an economic incentive not to disclose the true reason for their resignation in order to protect their existing equity ownership, business relationships, and future directorship opportunities. Consistent with these conjectures, we find that the likelihood of resignation increases with reputation and weak future performance. Moreover, cases where ambiguous or unverifiable resignation reasons are given, or no reason is provided, are associated with poor recent and future financial and operating performance. Investors and analysts appear to at least partially understand and respond to such misrepresentations, as evidenced by an immediate negative and economically significant market reaction and downward forecast revisions. Complementary factors such as positive concurrent operating results and richer information environment seem to alleviate investor concerns and mitigate the negative reaction.

Keywords

Independent Directors, Resignation, Disagreement, Information Content, Creditibility, Verifiability

Discipline

Accounting | Corporate Finance | Human Resources Management

Research Areas

Corporate Governance, Auditing and Risk Management

Publication

MIT Asia Conference in Accounting 2014, July 14-15, Chengdu, China; American Accounting Association Annual Meeting 2014, August 2-6

First Page

1

Last Page

50

City or Country

Chengdu, China

Copyright Owner and License

Authors

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.

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