Publication Type

Working Paper

Version

submittedVersion

Publication Date

11-2014

Abstract

Theory suggests that firms engage in opinion shopping to obtain better audit opinions. However, there is scarce evidence on the economic consequences of the opinion shopping behaviors. In this paper, we examine the effect of auditor switches for opinion shopping on audit quality and audit fees. Using 30,333 firm-year observations over the 2004-2012 period in the U.S., we first document evidence that firms switch their auditors in search for better audit opinions. Next, we find that the audit quality of clients that switch auditors for opinion shopping is significantly lower than that of clients that did not switch auditors or switched auditors for other purposes. Further tests reveal that these clients pay significantly higher audit fees to their successive auditors. Consequently, we provide compelling evidence that opinion shopping is detrimental to audit quality and auditor independence.

Keywords

opinion shopping, audit fees, audit quality

Discipline

Accounting | Corporate Finance

Research Areas

Corporate Governance, Auditing and Risk Management

First Page

1

Last Page

53

Copyright Owner and License

Authors

Comments

Published in Auditing, May 2019, 38 (2), 101-123. https://doi.org/10.2308/ajpt-52154.

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