A Comparison of Shareholder Identity and Governance Mechanisms in the Monitoring of CEOs of Listed Companies in China
This paper compares the relative effectiveness of two measures by which the Chinese government attempted to improve the monitoring of listed companies: shifting the ownership of state shares from government agencies (GAs) to the corporate form of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and strengthening corporate governance through statutory regulations and guidelines. The results show that SOEs are better able than GAs to monitor top executives, as indicated by a higher sensitivity of top executive turnover to firm performance. However, corporate governance mechanisms have no significant impact on the sensitivity of top executive turnover to firm performance. This study suggests that incentives for controlling shareholders are more important than governance mechanisms in replacing executives due to poor performance in a transitional economy such as China's, where institutions that support governance mechanisms are still being developed.
Accounting | Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics | Corporate Finance
Corporate Governance, Auditing and Risk Management
China Economic Review
A Comparison of Shareholder Identity and Governance Mechanisms in the Monitoring of CEOs of Listed Companies in China. (2009). China Economic Review. 21, (1), 24-37. Research Collection School Of Accountancy.
Available at: http://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research/130