Publication Type

Working Paper

Publication Date



In this paper, we examine the role of political connections on corporate liquidity policies and their consequences in an international setting. We find that managers of politically connected firms have a tendency to hoard more cash than their non-connected counterparts. Moreover, presence of political connections reduces the value of cash holdings. Further analysis reveals that our main findings are more pronounced for firms in emerging markets as well as for firms in countries with weak legal protection of investors and high levels of corruption. Overall, our empirical results corroborate previous findings on the agency cost explanation for corporate cash holdings.


Political connections, Cash holding, Legal protection, Corruption


Accounting | Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics

Research Areas

Corporate Governance, Auditing and Risk Management

First Page


Last Page


Creative Commons License

Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.