Do Analyst Regulations Work? Evidence from the Impact of NASD Rule 2711 on the Liquidity Changes Surrounding Coverage Initiations
We investigate the net effect of NASD Rule 2711 on information intermediary role of analysts by examining the market reaction and changes in liquidity surrounding coverage initiations in the pre- and post- regulation periods. This regulation was intended to eliminate conflict of interests faced by analysts with investment banking ties, but it has in essence blocked information flow between research and investment banking functions. We document that coverage initiations in the post-regulation period evoke stronger market reactions and greater liquidity improvements for firms with high pre-existing analyst coverage. These results indicate that the benefits of NASD Rule 2711 are mainly confined to firms with richer information environments. Further analyses reveal that these results are more pronounced for growth firms, suggesting that the benefits of the regulation are greater when the potential for conflict of interests is higher.
Accounting | Portfolio and Security Analysis
Financial Performance Analysis
Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics Symposium
City or Country
RANASINGHE, Tharindra; SHROFF, A; and SIVARAMAKRI, S.
Do Analyst Regulations Work? Evidence from the Impact of NASD Rule 2711 on the Liquidity Changes Surrounding Coverage Initiations. (2012). Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics Symposium. Research Collection School Of Accountancy.
Available at: http://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research/1021
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