Agents in a peer-to-peer system typically have incentives to influence its network structure, either to reduce their costs or increase their ability to capture value. The problem is compounded when agents can join and leave the system dynamically. This paper proposes three economic mechanisms that offset the incentives for strategic behavior and facilitate the formation of networks with desirable global properties.
Business | Computer Sciences | OS and Networks
Information Systems and Management
1st Workshop on Economics of Peer-to-Peer Systems (P2PEcon), 5-6 June 2003, Berkely, CA
City or Country
WOODARD, C. Jason and PARKES, David C..
Strategyproof Mechanisms for Ad Hoc Network Formation. (2003). 1st Workshop on Economics of Peer-to-Peer Systems (P2PEcon), 5-6 June 2003, Berkely, CA. 1-5. Research Collection School Of Information Systems.
Available at: http://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/825
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