Publication Type

Conference Paper

Publication Date

6-2003

Abstract

Agents in a peer-to-peer system typically have incentives to influence its network structure, either to reduce their costs or increase their ability to capture value. The problem is compounded when agents can join and leave the system dynamically. This paper proposes three economic mechanisms that offset the incentives for strategic behavior and facilitate the formation of networks with desirable global properties.

Discipline

Business | Computer Sciences | OS and Networks

Research Areas

Information Systems and Management

Publication

1st Workshop on Economics of Peer-to-Peer Systems (P2PEcon), 5-6 June 2003, Berkely, CA

First Page

1

Last Page

5

City or Country

Berkeley, CA

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.

Additional URL

http://www.eecs.harvard.edu/econcs/pubs/woodard03adhoc.pdf

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