Title

Vulnerability Analysis of Emap - an Efficient RFID Mutual Authentication Protocol

Publication Type

Conference Proceeding Article

Publication Date

12-2006

Abstract

In this paper, we analyze the security vulnerabilities of EMAP, an efficient RFID mutual authentication protocol recently proposed by Peris-Lopez et al. (2006). We present two effective attacks, a de-synchronization attack and a full-disclosure attack, against the protocol. The former permanently disables the authentication capability of a RFID tag by destroying synchronization between the tag and the RFID reader. The latter completely compromises a tag by extracting all the secret information stored in the tag. The de-synchronization attack can be carried out in just round of interaction in EMAP while the full-disclosure attack is accomplished across several runs of EMAP. We also discuss ways to counter the attacks

Discipline

Information Security

Research Areas

Information Security and Trust

Publication

Proceedings of the 2nd the International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security

First Page

238

Last Page

245

ISBN

9780769527758

Identifier

10.1109/ARES.2007.159

Publisher

IEEE

Additional URL

http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ARES.2007.159