Publication Type

Journal Article

Publication Date

11-2016

Abstract

Proxy re-encryption allows a semi-trusted proxy with a re-encryption key to convert a delegator's ciphertext into a delegatee's ciphertext, and the semi-trusted proxy cannot learn anything about the underlying plaintext. If a proxy re-encryption scheme is indistinguishable against chosen-ciphertext attacks, its initialized ciphertext should be non-malleable. Otherwise, there might exist an adversary who can break the chosen-ciphertext security of the scheme. Recently, Liang et al. proposed two proxy re-encryption schemes. They claimed that their schemes were chosen-ciphertext secure in the standard model. However, we find that the original ciphertext in their schemes are malleable. Thus, we present some concrete attacks and indicate their schemes fail to achieve chosen-ciphertext security in the standard model.

Keywords

Conditional proxy re-encryption; Identity-based; Single hop; Multi-hop; Chosen-ciphertext security

Discipline

Information Security

Research Areas

Cybersecurity

Publication

Theoretical Computer Science

Volume

652

First Page

18

Last Page

27

ISSN

0304-3975

Identifier

10.1016/j.tcs.2016.08.023

Publisher

Elsevier

Additional URL

http://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2016.08.023

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