Publication Type

Journal Article

Publication Date

12-2017

Abstract

In this paper, we estimate the impact of enforcing the Convention on Cybercrime (COC) on deterring distributed denial of service (DDOS) attacks. Our data set comprises a sample of real, random spoof-source DDOS attacks recorded in 106 countries in 177 days in the period 2004-2008. We find that enforcing the COC decreases DDOS attacks by at least 11.8 percent, but a similar deterrence effect does not exist if the enforcing countries make a reservation on international cooperation. We also find evidence of network and displacement effects in COC enforcement. Our findings imply attackers in cyberspace are rational, motivated by economic incentives, and strategic in choosing attack targets. We draw related implications.

Keywords

Cybercrime, deterrence, legislation, law enforcement, convention on cybercrime, distributed denial of service attack

Discipline

Computer Sciences | Information Security | Internet Law

Research Areas

Information Systems and Management

Publication

MIS Quarterly

Volume

41

ISSN

0276-7783

Publisher

University of Minnesota, Management Information Systems Research Center

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.

Additional URL

http://www.misq.org/skin/frontend/default/misq/pdf/Abstracts/12729_RA_WangAbstract.pdf

Comments

Wang Qiu Hong is the corresponding author. Authors are listed in alphabetical order.

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