Title

A note on the security of KHL scheme

Publication Type

Journal Article

Publication Date

10-2015

Abstract

A public key trace and revoke scheme combines the functionality of broadcast encryption with the capability of traitor tracing. In Asiacrypt 2003, Kim, Hwang and Lee proposed a public key trace and revoke scheme (referred to as KHL scheme), and gave the security proof to support that their scheme is z-resilient against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks, in which the adversary is allowed to adaptively issue decryption queries as well as adaptively corrupt up to z users. In the passed ten years, KHL scheme has been believed as one of the most efficient public key trace and revoke schemes with z-resilience against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks under the well-studied DDH assumption. However, in this paper, by giving a concrete attack, we indicate that KHL scheme is actually not secure against adaptive chosen-ciphertexts, even without corruption of any user. We then identify the flaws in the security proof for KHL-scheme, and discuss the consequences of the attack. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Keywords

Cryptography, Traitor-tracing, Broadcast encryption, Chosen-ciphertext attacks

Discipline

Computer Sciences | Information Security

Research Areas

Cybersecurity

Publication

Theoretical Computer Science

Volume

602

First Page

1

Last Page

6

ISSN

0304-3975

Identifier

10.1016/j.tcs.2015.07.051

Publisher

Elsevier

Additional URL

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2015.07.051

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