This paper examines a monopoly platform's two-sided pricing strategies in a setting with seller competition, which gives rise to not only positive cross-side network effects between buyers and sellers, but also a negative same-side network effect among sellers. We show that platform pricing depends crucially on the characteristics associated with market liquidity, which contrasts with the previous studies that point to the two sides' relative demand elasticities and/or network effects. A market is said to be more liquid when it has less friction, resulting in a larger total surplus for the platform economy and hence greater equilibrium entry on both sides. We find that in response to higher market liquidity, the platform raises the buyer entry fee and lowers the seller entry fee. The platform's subsidy strategy is consistent: market liquidity is conducive to seller subsidy but hinders buyer subsidy.
Two-sided platforms, network effects, market liquidity, subsidy, product differentiation
Computer Sciences | Management Information Systems | OS and Networks
Information Systems and Management
Lin, Mei; Wu, Ruhai; and Zhou, Wen.
Endogenous Network Effects, Platform Pricing and Market Liquidity. (2015). Research Collection School Of Information Systems.
Available at: http://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/2219
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.