Analyzing Auction and Bargaining Mechanisms in E-Procurement with Supply Quality Risk
We compare two mechanisms from the buyer’s perspective in multi-attribute supply procurement, with verifiable and unverifiable quality of the supplies and risk aversion to deviation from acceptable quality: an auction mechanism and a generalized Nash bargaining mechanism. We develop a model to represent the effects on the buyer’s dominant strategy of bargaining and auction participation. The results suggest the conditions for which bargaining is preferred over the auction mechanism alone.
Computer Sciences | E-Commerce | Management Information Systems
Information Systems and Management
Operations Research Letters
HUANG, He; XU, Hongyan; Kauffman, Robert J.; and SUN, Ning.
Analyzing Auction and Bargaining Mechanisms in E-Procurement with Supply Quality Risk. (2013). Operations Research Letters. 41, (4), 403-409. Research Collection School Of Information Systems.
Available at: http://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/2111