Publication Type

Conference Proceeding Article

Publication Date

11-2011

Abstract

Since the day it was proposed, return-oriented programming has shown to be an effective and powerful attack technique against the write or execute only (W ⊕ X) protection. However, a general belief in the previous research is, systems deployed with address space randomization where the executables are also randomized at run-time are able to defend against return-oriented programming, as the addresses of all instructions are randomized. In this paper, we show that due to the weakness of current address space randomization technique, there are still ways of launching return-oriented programming attacks against those well-protected systems efficiently. We demonstrate and evaluate our attacks with existing typical web server applications and discuss possible methods of mitigating such threats.

Keywords

address space randomization, position independent executable, return-oriented programming

Discipline

Information Security

Research Areas

Information Security and Trust

Publication

TrustCom 2011: International Joint Conference of IEEE TrustCom-11, IEEE ICESS-11 / FCST-11: 16-19 November 2011, Changsha, Hunan

First Page

37

Last Page

44

ISBN

9781457721359

Identifier

10.1109/TrustCom.2011.9

Publisher

IEEE

City or Country

Changsha, China

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.

Additional URL

http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TrustCom.2011.9

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