Publication Type

Conference Proceeding Article

Publication Date

5-2010

Abstract

Proxy re-encryption (PRE) allows a semi-trusted proxy to convert a ciphertext originally intended for Alice into one encrypting the same plaintext for Bob. The proxy only needs a re-encryption key given by Alice, and cannot learn anything about the plaintext encrypted. This adds flexibility in various applications, such as confidential email, digital right management and distributed storage. In this paper, we study unidirectional PRE, which the re-encryption key only enables delegation in one direction but not the opposite. In PKC 2009, Shao and Cao proposed a unidirectional PRE assuming the random oracle. However, we show that it is vulnerable to chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA). We then propose an efficient unidirectional PRE scheme (without resorting to pairings). We gain high efficiency and CCA-security using the “token-controlled encryption” technique, under the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption, in the random oracle model and a relaxed but reasonable definition.

Keywords

proxy re-encryption, unidirection, chosen-ciphertext attack

Discipline

Information Security

Research Areas

Cybersecurity

Publication

Progress in Cryptology - AFRICACRYPT 2010: Third International Conference on Cryptology in Africa, Stellenbosch, South Africa, May 3-6: Proceedings

Volume

6055

First Page

316

Last Page

332

ISBN

9783642126789

Identifier

10.1007/978-3-642-12678-9_19

Publisher

Springer Verlag

City or Country

Berlin

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.

Additional URL

http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-12678-9_19

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