Publication Type

Conference Proceeding Article

Publication Date

7-2004

Abstract

In a symmetric game, every player is identical with respect to the game rules. We show that a symmetric 2strategy game must have a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. We also discuss Nash’s original paper and its generalized notion of symmetry in games. As a special case of Nash’s theorem, any finite symmetric game has a symmetric Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, symmetric infinite games with compact, convex strategy spaces and continuous, quasiconcave utility functions have symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibria. Finally, we discuss how to exploit symmetry for more efficient methods of finding Nash equilibria.

Discipline

Artificial Intelligence and Robotics | Business | Operations Research, Systems Engineering and Industrial Engineering

Research Areas

Intelligent Systems and Decision Analytics

Publication

Proceedings of the 6th International Workshop On Game Theoretic And Decision Theoretic Agents GTDT 2004

First Page

71

Last Page

78

Publisher

GTDT

City or Country

New York

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.

Additional URL

http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.137.4019