Conference Proceeding Article
In a symmetric game, every player is identical with respect to the game rules. We show that a symmetric 2strategy game must have a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. We also discuss Nash’s original paper and its generalized notion of symmetry in games. As a special case of Nash’s theorem, any finite symmetric game has a symmetric Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, symmetric infinite games with compact, convex strategy spaces and continuous, quasiconcave utility functions have symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibria. Finally, we discuss how to exploit symmetry for more efficient methods of finding Nash equilibria.
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Proceedings of the 6th International Workshop On Game Theoretic And Decision Theoretic Agents GTDT 2004
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CHENG, Shih-Fen; REEVES, Daniel M.; VOROBEYCHIK, Yevgeniy; and WELLMAN, Michael P..
Notes on Equilibria in Symmetric Games. (2004). Proceedings of the 6th International Workshop On Game Theoretic And Decision Theoretic Agents GTDT 2004. 71-78. Research Collection School Of Information Systems.
Available at: http://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/1213
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