Title

Security Analysis of Some Proxy Signature

Publication Type

Conference Proceeding Article

Publication Date

3-2004

Abstract

A proxy signature scheme allows an entity to delegate his/her signing capability to another entity in such a way that the latter can sign messages on behalf of the former. Such schemes have been suggested for use in a number of applications, particularly in distributed computing where delegation of rights is quite common. Followed by the first schemes introduced by Mambo, Usuda and Okamoto in 1996, a number of new schemes and improvements have been proposed. In this paper, we present a security analysis of four such schemes newly proposed. By successfully identifying several interesting forgery attacks, we show that these four schemes all are insecure. Consequently, the fully distributed proxy scheme is also insecure since it is based on the (insecure) LKK scheme. In addition, we point out the reasons why the security proofs provided are invalid.

Keywords

Digital signatures, proxy signatures, security analysis

Discipline

Information Security

Research Areas

Cybersecurity

Publication

Information Security and Cryptology - ICISC 2003: 6th International Conference, Seoul, Korea, November 27-28: Revised Papers

Volume

2971

First Page

305

Last Page

319

ISBN

9783540246916

Identifier

10.1007/978-3-540-24691-6_23

Publisher

Springer Verlag

City or Country

Berlin

Additional URL

http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24691-6_23