A spatially extended version of the game of prisoner’s dilemma, originally proposed by Nowak and May, is modified to include stochastic updating and found to exhibit scale-invariant behavior. Two critical regimes with different scaling behaviors are found; the corresponding exponents have been determined numerically. Spatially, the critical states are characterized by the existence of delicately balanced networks of defectors separating domains of cooperators; temporally, the evolution of the critical states following local perturbations is characterized by avalanches of various magnitudes, which cause restructuring of the networks of defectors on all scales.
Business | Management Sciences and Quantitative Methods | Operations and Supply Chain Management
Physical Review E
American Physical Society
LIM, Yun Fong; Chen, Kan; and Jayaprakash, Ciriyam.
Scale-Invariant Behavior in a Spatial Game of Prisoners’ Dilemma. (2002). Physical Review E. 65, (2), 1-6. Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business.
Available at: http://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/878