Publication Type

Working Paper

Publication Date

8-2017

Abstract

We show that a firm’s information environment is significantly impacted by the characteristics of the other firms its analysts cover. Analysts strategically allocate effort among portfolio firms by devoting more effort to firms that are relatively more important for their career concerns. Specifically, controlling for analyst and firm characteristics, we find that within each analyst’s portfolio, firms ranked relatively higher based on market capitalization, trading volume, or institutional ownership receive more accurate, frequent, and informative earnings forecast revisions and stock recommendation changes that contain greater information content from that analyst. Firms’ relative rank across analysts varies widely, so this is not a firm characteristic. As a result, even with explicit controls for firm characteristics, firms where a larger proportion of their analysts consider them as relatively more important are associated with more transparent information environments. Finally, we find that analysts who engage in a greater extent of career concerns-driven effort allocation are more likely to experience favorable career outcomes.

Keywords

Sell-side analysts; Effort allocation; Limited attention; Career concerns; Earnings forecast; Stock recommendation; Firm information environment; Labor market outcomes

Discipline

Corporate Finance | Finance and Financial Management

Research Areas

Finance

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.

Additional URL

https://ssrn.com/abstract=2947193

Comments

(To be presented at 2017 AFA)

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