Publication Type

Working Paper

Publication Date

12-2016

Abstract

Hedge funds managed by listed firms significantly underperform funds managed by unlisted firms. The underperformance is more severe for funds with low manager deltas, poor governance, and no manager co-investment, or managed by firms whose prices are sensitive to earnings news. Notwithstanding the underperformance, listed firms raise more capital and harvest greater fee revenues than do comparable unlisted firms. The results cannot be explained by endogeneity, backfill bias, serial correlation, or manager manipulation, and are consistent with the view that, for asset management firms, going public weakens the alignment between ownership, control, and investment capital, thereby engendering conflicts of interest.

Keywords

Hedge funds, Initial Public Offering, Agency, Conflicts of interest, Short-termism

Discipline

Finance and Financial Management

Research Areas

Finance

Identifier

10.2139/ssrn.2883416

Publisher

SSRN

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.

Additional URL

http://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2883416

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