Publication Type

Journal Article

Publication Date

4-2016

Abstract

Social capital can serve as informal governance in weak investor-protection regimes. Using hand-collected data on entrepreneurs' political connections and firm ownership, we construct several original measures of social capital and examine their effect on the performance of entrepreneurial firms in China after their initial public offerings. Political connections or a high percentage of external investors tend to enhance firm performance, but intragroup related-party transactions commonly lead to performance decline. These forms of social capital have a strong influence on the performance of Chinese firms, whereas formal governance variables such as board size or board independence have little effect. Although social capital may serve as an informal governance mechanism and effectively substitute for formal governance mechanisms in an emerging market, this role of social capital raises several ethical concerns, notably the development of rent-seeking and crony capitalism.

Keywords

Post-IPO performance, Social capital, Agency theory, Entrepreneur, Political connection, China

Discipline

Asian Studies | Corporate Finance | Entrepreneurial and Small Business Operations

Research Areas

Finance

Publication

Journal of Business Ethics

Volume

134

Issue

4

First Page

529

Last Page

551

ISSN

0167-4544

Identifier

10.1007/s10551-014-2383-5

Publisher

Springer Verlag (Germany)

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.

Additional URL

http://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-014-2383-5

Comments

Presented at Conference on the Sustainable and Ethical Entrepreneurship, Corporate Finance and Governance, and Institutional Reform in China, Beijing, April 6-7, 2013