Ownership and Voting Power in Germany
This paper analyses the voting control structure of industrial firms listed on the official market in Germany. Voting control is highly concentrated and few companies are widely held. Widely held companies typically have takeover defences in place, but these are increasingly eroded by the control and transparency law.
Corporations, voting power, Germany, corporate control, corporate governance, ownership, takeover defences, voting control
Business | Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics | Corporate Finance
The Control of Corporate Europe
Oxford University Press
City or Country
Becht, Marco and BOEHMER, Ekkehart.
Ownership and Voting Power in Germany. (2001). The Control of Corporate Europe. Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business.
Available at: http://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/4718
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