Title

Privatization in Emerging Economies: An Agency Perspective

Publication Type

Journal Article

Publication Date

7-2000

Abstract

The ineffectiveness of several privatized firms within emerging economies underscores the importance of agency theory issues and their impact on the privatization-performance relationship. The authors argue that weak governance and limited protection of minority shareholders intensify traditional principal-agent problems (perquisite consumption and entrenchment) and create unique agency problems (expropriation). The authors suggest that postprivatization performance can be enhanced by using appropriate ownership, management, and corporate structures that mitigate agency problems in the context of weak governance, and they highlight avenues for research.

Keywords

Privatization, Agency theory, organizational structure

Discipline

Business | Organizational Behavior and Theory | Strategic Management Policy

Research Areas

Strategy and Organisation

Publication

Academy of Management Review

Volume

25

Issue

3

First Page

650

Last Page

669

ISSN

0001-4273

Identifier

10.5465/AMR.2000.3363533

Publisher

Academy of Management

Additional URL

http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/AMR.2000.3363533