The ineffectiveness of several privatized firms within emerging economies underscores the importance of agency theory issues and their impact on the privatization-performance relationship. The authors argue that weak governance and limited protection of minority shareholders intensify traditional principal-agent problems (perquisite consumption and entrenchment) and create unique agency problems (expropriation). The authors suggest that postprivatization performance can be enhanced by using appropriate ownership, management, and corporate structures that mitigate agency problems in the context of weak governance, and they highlight avenues for research.
Privatization, Agency theory, organizational structure
Business | Organizational Behavior and Theory | Strategic Management Policy
Strategy and Organisation
Academy of Management Review
Academy of Management
DHARWADKAR, Bavi; GEORGE, Gerard; and BRANDES, Pamela.
Privatization in Emerging Economies: An Agency Theory Perspective. (2000). Academy of Management Review. 25, (3), 650-669. Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business.
Available at: http://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/4632
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