Title

Do underwriters compete in IPO pricing?

Publication Type

Journal Article

Publication Date

12-2016

Abstract

We propose and implement a direct test of the hypothesis of oligopolistic competition in the U.S. underwriting market against the alternative of implicit collusion among underwriters. We construct a simple model of interaction between heterogenous underwriters and heterogenous firms and solve it under two alternative assumptions: oligopolistic competition among underwriters and implicit collusion among them. The two solutions lead to different equilibrium relations between the compensation of underwriters of different quality on one hand and the time-varying demand for public incorporation on the other hand. Our empirical results, obtained using 39 years of IPO data, are generally consistent with the implicit collusion hypothesis – banks, especially larger ones, seem to internalize the effects of their underwriting fees and IPO pricing on their rivals.

Keywords

IPOs, underwriters, competition, collusion

Discipline

Business | Corporate Finance | Finance and Financial Management

Research Areas

Finance

Publication

Management Science

ISSN

0025-1909

Identifier

10.1287/mnsc.2016.2587

Publisher

INFORMS

Copyright Owner and License

Authors

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.

Additional URL

http://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2016.2587

This document is currently not available here.

Share

COinS