Firm innovative knowledge assets and economic performance: The asymmetric roles of incentive- and monitoring-based governance mechanisms
We posit that a firm's resource configuration constitutes a critical context for various corporate governance mechanisms. Although innovative knowledge assets are generally a key determinant of a firm's economic performance, they also lead to greater information asymmetry among managers and owners and to the need to grant managers more discretion in making resource deployment decisions. This weakens the role of monitoring but increases the effectiveness of incentive mechanisms. Therefore, we hypothesize asymmetric moderating effects of monitoring- and incentive-based governance mechanisms on the relationship between innovative knowledge assets and economic performance. Our empirical analyses provide support for the key arguments.
Strategic Management Policy
Strategy and Organisation
Academy of Management Journal
Academy of Management
He, J and WANG, Heli.
Firm innovative knowledge assets and economic performance: The asymmetric roles of incentive- and monitoring-based governance mechanisms. (2009). Academy of Management Journal. 52, (5), 919-938. Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business.
Available at: http://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/3446