Publication Type

Journal Article

Publication Date

10-1993

Abstract

This paper studies the hypothesis that auctions with resale markets result in higher prices. The vehicle quota system introduced in Singapore in May 1990 provides the setting. The Certificates of Entitlement (COEs) necessary to purchase new cars were initially transferable for all quota categories. After October 1991, COEs for four major categories became non-transferable. Our results indicate that while the conversion to non-transferability eliminated speculation, it has also intensified competition among car distributors. Auctions for non-transferable COEs in fact led to higher COE prices in three of the four categories.

Keywords

Auctions, Bidders, Resale value, Vehicles, Singapore

Discipline

Asian Studies | Economics | Finance and Financial Management

Research Areas

Quantitative Finance; Applied Microeconomics

Publication

Asia Pacific Journal of Management

Volume

10

Issue

2

First Page

177

Last Page

194

ISSN

0217-4561

Identifier

10.1007/BF01734277

Publisher

Springer Verlag

Copyright Owner and License

Authors

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.

Additional URL

http://doi.org/10.1007/BF01734277

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