Publication Type

Journal Article

Publication Date

4-2017

Abstract

Research and development (R&D) collaborations, common in high-tech industries, are challenging to manage due to technical and market risks as well as incentive problems. We investigate how control rights, options, payment terms and timing allow the innovator to capture maximum value from its R&D collaborations with a marketer. Our study reveals a counterintuitive result; the innovator may, under certain conditions, prefer to grant launch control rights or buy-out options to the marketer despite the fact that both terms restrict its downstream actions. We demonstrate that a menu of contracts is not necessary to address the adverse selection problem as the menu can be replicated by a single option contract. We show that timing, through renegotiation or delayed contracting, as well as the careful allocation of control rights and options can have a significant influence on the value of collaborative R&D. We provide recommendations on the optimal contract structure and timing based on two project characteristics, novelty of the R&D process and market-potential variability.

Keywords

Research & Development, Innovation, Contract Design, Double Moral Hazard

Discipline

Business | Contracts | Operations and Supply Chain Management

Research Areas

Operations Management

Publication

Management Science

Volume

63

Issue

4

First Page

1131

Last Page

1149

ISSN

0025-1909

Identifier

10.1287/mnsc.2015.2386

Publisher

INFORMS

Copyright Owner and License

Authors

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.

Additional URL

http://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2015.2386

Share

COinS