Publication Type

Journal Article

Version

Preprint

Publication Date

7-2013

Abstract

Theory and recent evidence suggest that overvalued firms can create value for shareholders if they exploit their overvaluation by using their stock as currency to purchase less overvalued firms. We challenge this idea and show that, in practice, overvalued acquirers significantly overpay for their targets. These acquisitions do not, in turn, lead to synergy gains. Moreover, these acquisitions seem to be concentrated among acquirers with the largest governance problems. CEO compensation, not shareholder value creation, appears to be the main motive behind acquisitions by overvalued acquirers.

Keywords

Mergers and acquisitions, Stock overvaluation, Operating performance, Agency costs, CEO compensation

Discipline

Corporate Finance | Finance and Financial Management

Research Areas

Finance

Publication

Journal of Financial Economics

Volume

109

Issue

1

First Page

24

Last Page

39

ISSN

0304-405X

Identifier

10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.02.013

Publisher

Elsevier

Additional URL

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.02.013

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