Publication Type

Journal Article

Publication Date

3-2010

Abstract

This paper focuses on a type of firms that have been traditionally neglected in both family business and governance research, namely, family-controlled, publicly-listed firms. Although principal-agent conflicts may be less prevalent in such firms, family control can potentially give rise to principal-principal conflicts, leading to expropriation of the wealth of minority owners by family owners. Superior firm performance and the willingness to distribute the profits through dividend payments would suggest the absence of such expropriation. Based on a sample of 210 OTC firms in Japan, we examined the relationships between family control and dividend payouts and profitability. Our results indicate that family control was positively related to dividend payouts. Further, we found that while foreign ownership interacted with family control to reduce dividend payouts and increase profitability, bank ownership did not have such an effect.

Discipline

Asian Studies | Entrepreneurial and Small Business Operations | Strategic Management Policy

Research Areas

Strategy and Organisation

Publication

Journal of Management Studies

Volume

47

Issue

2

First Page

274

Last Page

295

ISSN

0022-2380

Identifier

10.1111/j.1467-6486.2009.00891.x

Publisher

Wiley

Copyright Owner and License

Authors

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.

Additional URL

http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6486.2009.00891.x