Individual Exemptions and the Strategic Threat of Exit: The Case of Airline Joint Service Agreements
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the strategic interaction between firm and competition authority in the context of individual exemptions for certain airline alliance agreements. We begin by developing a bargaining theory model of individual exemptions with exit. We then apply the model to individual exemptions for airline joint service agreements. We devote particular attention to the recent decisions on airline joint service agreements by the competition authorities in Australia and Singapore.
bargaining theory, competition authority
Strategic Management Policy
Strategy and Organisation
Strategic Firm-Authority Interaction in Antitrust, Merger Control and Regulation, Amsterdam, March 2007
City or Country
MacRae, Cecil Duncan and MACRAE, Elizabeth Chase.
Individual Exemptions and the Strategic Threat of Exit: The Case of Airline Joint Service Agreements. (2007). Strategic Firm-Authority Interaction in Antitrust, Merger Control and Regulation, Amsterdam, March 2007. 32. Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business.
Available at: http://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/2788
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