Title

Individual Exemptions and the Strategic Threat of Exit: The Case of Airline Joint Service Agreements

Publication Type

Conference Paper

Publication Date

3-2007

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the strategic interaction between firm and competition authority in the context of individual exemptions for certain airline alliance agreements. We begin by developing a bargaining theory model of individual exemptions with exit. We then apply the model to individual exemptions for airline joint service agreements. We devote particular attention to the recent decisions on airline joint service agreements by the competition authorities in Australia and Singapore.

Keywords

bargaining theory, competition authority

Discipline

Strategic Management Policy

Research Areas

Strategy and Organisation

Publication

Strategic Firm-Authority Interaction in Antitrust, Merger Control and Regulation, Amsterdam, March 2007

First Page

32

City or Country

Amsterdam, Netherlands

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